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Abstract 
In the US Congress it has been shown that factors such as the electoral cycle, seat 
stability, and party strength affect how legislators approach dealing with legislation, especially 
potentially controversial legislation. I believe that there remains much to be gained from 
analyzing state senates and deriving patterns in roll-call voting behavior. I examine the 
scheduling of roll-call votes regarding abortion legislation and compare the results across state 
senates in an attempt to derive patterns in behavior. The variables examined included electoral 
cycle type, Republican electoral vote share per seat, average percent Republican seat gain per 
election, party control, recent control changes, and the level of senate professionalism. I found 
that stronger Republican parties correlate with earlier roll-call votes and that more professional 
senates and senates with longer, non-staggered election cycles have clearer scheduling patterns 
than their less professional and shorter, staggered counterparts.  
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Introduction 
The roll-call voting patterns of US Congress legislators have been the subject of many 
studies, particularly in the senate. Understanding common legislator behavior factors directly 
into understanding how the government functions on a practical level, answering questions such 
as: Why do legislators sometimes vote one way, and then a few years later vote the other way? 
What factors, other than personal beliefs, influence legislators to vote one way or another? What 
factors influence when and on what sort of legislation legislators vote? This last question is the 
focus of this study. 
The literature review summarizes the patterns that are well-established in the US Congress 
and outlines the limited knowledge about patterns at the state level. The desire to be re-elected is 
shown to influence individual legislators’ voting behavior, and these behavioral changes are 
patterned according to the length of the election cycle and at what point in the election cycle the 
vote takes place, as well as the makeup of the constituency and the party membership of the 
legislator. This effect holds true and even becomes more pronounced for controversial 
legislation. There is very limited scholarship on state legislator behavior. The studies that do 
exist suggest that state legislators do not vary their behavior as much, but these are inconclusive 
at best. 
The theory section outlines the hypotheses for how these federal patterns translate over to the 
state level, as well as predicting new ones. I ask the question: what political conditions influence 
when state legislators schedule roll-call votes on controversial legislation? If senators can modify 
their votes to please their constituents when an election is approaching, it seems reasonable to 
assume that senators will schedule potentially displeasing votes earlier in the election cycle so as 
to avoid upsetting constituents, and vice versa.  
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Studying state legislators as a group is complex, as state legislators are working in fifty 
different environments. These varying environments make it difficult to account for all of the 
potential confounding variables. To simplify matters as much as possible, I limit my study to 
state senates and legislation involving the expansion or restriction of abortion access. The main 
issue was that I wanted to find a general pattern that could potentially fit all, or most state 
senates. And so, I create a design that accounts for many of the differences between state 
legislative bodies, avoiding confounding variables. I also used the scheduling of the roll-call 
votes as my main units of analysis: or, when in the election cycle roll-call votes were placed on 
each senate’s calendar. To further account for differences, the analysis of the different pieces of 
legislation comes in three phases, only the last of which deals with the actual roll-call vote itself. 
The research design section will outline the data that was gathered, the methods by which it 
was gathered, and how it was processed and analyzed.  
The last section will cover the results of the analysis and summarize the findings.  
 
Literature Review 
The studies examined here and the design and analysis following operate on the 
assumption that all elected officials desire to be re-elected and much of their behavior will be 
influenced by that desire, as outlined by Mayhew (1974).  
There have been multiple studies regarding the roll call voting behavior of legislators at 
the federal level. There is a well-researched claim that US representatives must be more cautious 
with their voting behaviors than US senators because their election cycles are so much shorter. 
One of the more recent studies, by Lee, Moretti, and Butler in 2015, undertook a detailed 
analysis of the voting patterns of US House legislators who won their districts very narrowly in 
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their previous election. It was assumed that the winners of these elections won “randomly,” as 
the election could have easily been swayed if a few more constituents had decided to vote that 
day. These “random assignment” electoral win districts are then compared to other districts, 
where the “probability” of being re-elected is calculated according to whether the party had 
previous wins in these districts. It stands to reason that the “randomly-assigned” winners would 
have a smaller probability of being re-elected than winners of other districts, and thus would 
likely be more concerned with pleasing their constituents. Looking at the voting records of the 
“randomly assigned” winners and the voting records of the legislators with a high probability of 
being re-elected, they found that their voting records were very similar, suggesting that either the 
legislators are not concerned at all about the effects of their roll-call votes on their prospects of 
being re-elected (unlikely), or (more likely), US House members are very concerned with 
establishing a consistent voting record because they must run for re-election so often. It stands to 
reason then that the US House legislators tend to consistently vote as their constituency would 
expect, regardless of their probability of being re-elected. 
In their 1978 study Amacher, Ryan, and Boyes ran an analysis of the roll-call voting 
behaviors of US Senators on the premise that the length of the election cycle affects how 
independently US senators feel they can operate without jeopardizing their chances of re-
election. They measured the differences between US Senate legislators’ roll call votes and US 
House legislators’ roll call votes within a certain time period – in this case, the 93rd Congress. 
Under the assumption that the US House legislators’ roll call voting behavior more closely 
matched the desires of a state’s constituency, they measured by how much senators deviated 
from the voting patterns of their colleagues from the same state in the House, and found that 
senators who were near the beginning of their electoral cycle (four or five years away from 
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facing re-election) voted much more independently than those near the end of their election cycle 
(one or two years away from facing re-election).  
The results of these two studies establish that the length of an election cycle has an effect 
on the roll-call voting patterns of US legislators, and it is this fact that convinced me to limit my 
study to state senates. The varying election cycle types of state senates allow me to study how 
different election cycles may affect the scheduling of roll-call votes. 
Moreover, a study of influences on US Senators by John Jackson in 1974 found that 
constituencies’ opinions affected senatorial voting behavior more so than other significant 
influences, such as political parties, committee leaders, the President, or other leaders. A study 
by Steven Levitt in 1996 looked at this in more detail by tabulating how senators “weigh” the 
various influences around them when considering how to vote, including their own ideology and 
the preferences of their constituency. He found that while senators always consider to some 
extent the preferences of their constituency, they more heavily weigh their constituency 
preferences as an election approaches. In other words, they give more consideration to what their 
constituents want as they are coming up for re-election. This fits with the assumption that 
senators (and elected officials in general) desire to be re-elected, and will modify their behaviors 
to something more desirable for their constituents, when those constituents are more likely to be 
paying attention. This is another basis for my study: I assume that senators will schedule roll-call 
votes depending on whether they want their constituents to be paying attention, or whether 
they’d prefer their roll-call votes to be more hidden. 
When we consider more controversial subjects, it becomes more important to consider 
whether legislators are more motivated by their personal ideology, or by the pressures of their 
constituents. A telling study by Brady and Schwartz in 1995 select a single topic (that of 
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abortion) and analyze by how much US senators were motivated beyond their own ideology to 
cast certain roll call votes. They looked specifically at senators where their “party ideology” (an 
assumed measure of their personal ideology) doesn’t match up with their “state ideology”—eg, a 
pro-life Republican from a pro-choice state. They found that senators who had to face many 
different sorts of constituents (eg, a pro-life Republican facing a pro-life constituency in a 
primary election but a pro-choice constituency in the general election) had different voting 
patterns on the issue of abortion than senators with a more homogenous constituency (eg, a pro-
life Republican from pro-life Texas). This suggests that the preferences of constituencies play a 
role in influencing the roll-call votes of senators, even when they disagree with their senator’s 
party, and even in the case of issues with strong ideological connotations.  
Though these behavioral tendencies are fairly well-established at the federal level, they 
are less so at the state level. There are fewer studies that attempt to study state legislator behavior 
– partially because the state level can get more complex. Those that do study state legislator 
behavior have not found strong indications one way or the other on how the electoral cycle may 
or may not affect legislator roll-call voting behavior. Steven Rogers’ 2017 study looks at public 
opinion on key roll call votes, how the legislators voted, and the subsequent effect on the 
legislators’ vote share in the following election. He was unable to find any correlation between 
the voting records of legislators at the state level and their consequential re-electability—a 
striking difference from what is found at the federal level. Gerald Wright in 2007 did a similar 
study, looking at state legislator behavior from a slightly different angle – he compared the 
voting behaviors of legislators up for re-election with those who had reached their last term 
because of term limits. He found that while legislators become “lazier” in their last term when 
they don’t have to worry about re-election (voting less frequently, etc.), they still stay 
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ideologically constant. Like Rogers’ study, this suggests that state legislators don’t have the 
same concerns that federal legislators do regarding re-electability.  
 
Theory 
There are several broad conclusions we can draw from the literature: first, that the length 
and type of election cycle is an important factor in understanding the roll-call voting behavior of 
legislators. Second, that the closer a vote takes place to an election, the more likely senators are 
to vote according to what their constituents would want – and conversely, the further away a vote 
takes place to an election, the more likely senators are to vote against what their constituents 
would want. These two facts together suggest that when in the election cycle a vote takes place is 
an important predictor of how senators may vote. Third, controversial roll-call votes carry with 
them more weight and risk than regular votes. Research on state senators’ behavior shows a 
greater tendency to stay ideologically consistent and not be as strongly influenced by their 
constituencies in comparison to their federal counterparts. However, this information has been 
pulled from a large pool of senatorial roll-call votes, regarding all types of legislation. When 
certain types of legislation are isolated, a pattern may emerge. It’s reasonable to theorize that 
roll-call vote patterns with controversial legislation may be more pronounced than other votes, as 
they may get much riskier nearer to an election than other types of roll-call votes. It is for this 
reason that I decided to use abortion legislation as the focus of this study – it is a very 
controversial subject today, with clear differences between parties. The Democratic party will 
generally try to expand/maintain access to abortion services, and the Republican party will 
generally try to restrict access to abortion services. 
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Because there is only one body of interest in federal studies of senators (the US Senate), 
the units of analysis are typically individual votes by individual senators, analyzed over time. 
Usually, the intent is to examine in one way or another how individual senators believe their roll-
call votes may affect their re-election prospects. Unlike in studies at the federal level, recording 
how individual senators’ voting patterns change over time is not feasible at the state level. 
Because individual state senators are in varying environments from state to state, there are 
innumerable differences between each seat in each senate in each state. For practical purposes 
then, my intent is so find general trends in state senates for scheduling controversial roll-call 
votes, rather than general trends for state senators’ roll-call voting behaviors. If senators of a 
party believe a certain controversial roll-call vote may damage their re-election prospects, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that they are more likely to attempt to schedule it earlier in the election 
cycle, and vice versa. 
When studying state senates, we have the ability to exploit a natural experiment – 
comparing similarly-structured government bodies (state senates) within similar contexts (within 
the same span of years, within the same country), and contrasting their behaviors due to the 
specifics of their governments (party security, senate professionalism, etc.). Because the intent is 
to establish general controversial legislation scheduling patterns for state senates, and for roll-
call votes of individual senators, the unit of analysis is the scheduled placement of a roll-call vote 
in the election cycle. Assuming that all senators wish to be re-elected, and that each party will 
generally behave as a cohesive body and follow similar strategies, the scheduling of roll-call 
votes will be an indicator of how state senators believe the roll-call votes will affect their re-
election prospects, and the other variables will indicate how those beliefs are modified with 
varying circumstances.  
9 
 
 The election cycle is the predominate subject of interest in this study. If state senators are 
concerned about how their behavior surrounding the abortion issue may influence their base of 
support in their district in their next election, then they will modify their behavior in order to 
benefit their next election. This desire is the same at the party level – the Republican Party will 
generally work as a unit to get as many Republican senators re-elected, and the same goes for the 
Democratic Party. What I am examining is the timing of scheduled roll-call votes and observing 
subtle changes in the schedule that legislators may use to benefit their upcoming elections.  
I hypothesize that a weaker party will be motivated to take risks in the hope that they can 
gain some political ground, and so will attempt to schedule controversial votes later in the 
election cycle so as to “rock the boat” and motivate their base to vote on Election Day. 
Conversely, a strong party has no motivation to “rock the boat” and risk losing support and so 
will try to have controversial votes scheduled earlier in the election cycle, when the electorate is 
less likely to be paying attention and more likely to forget anything that offends them by Election 
Day.  
As demonstrated at the federal level, the shorter election cycles of the US Congress don’t 
allow for enough temporal “wiggle room” for legislators to change their behaviors drastically. 
Therefore, I expect that a longer election cycle will allow for more variation in scheduling than 
in shorter or staggered election cycles. 
State Senates also vary in their levels of professionalism. This is likely to influence both how 
concerned they are with re-election and how much influence controversial legislation has over 
that re-election. 
 In summary, then: 
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Hypothesis 1: A stronger party (as defined in subheadings a – d) will schedule 
controversial votes earlier in the election cycle. A weaker party will schedule controversial votes 
later in the election cycle. 
a. Average vote share per seat – indicative of the party’s average control of 
individual seats 
b. Average seat gain or loss per election cycle – indicative of party’s climbing or 
declining strength over the period of years of interest 
c. Recent control change – indicative of how precarious a party’s control of 
Congress is 
d. Party control – indicative of whether a party controls over 60% of the seats or not 
when a bill is proposed 
Hypothesis 2: Longer election cycles will have more evident patterns than shorter 
election cycles and election cycles with staggering 
Hypothesis 3: More professional Senates will have more evident patterns in scheduled 
votes than less professional Senates. 
 
Data and Methods 
State senates were selected as the body of choice for a few reasons. Primarily it is because 
they tend to have longer election cycles, which allows more time for behavioral changes. Yet 
some also have shorter or staggered election cycles, providing opportunity to observe how cycle 
lengths/types affect the scheduling of roll-call votes. Secondly, and less importantly, state 
senates have fewer members than their house counterparts and are generally viewed by voters as 
the more “important” body, and so senators may be placed under more scrutiny when elections 
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are upcoming, which increases the probability that senatorial behaviors will change throughout 
the election cycle.  
The years in which I gathered legislation data range from 2010-2016, with a majority within 
the years 2012-2016, depending on when the election cycles took place. I wanted the timing to 
be relatively recent and with relatively constant national conditions – therefore a time with a 
single president and arguably no dramatic changes that affected the entire country, like the 2008 
economic crash. 
In order for a piece of legislation to be put up for a vote, it must first be put through a vetting 
process. In order to reasonably compare voting patterns in different states, the differences in the 
likelihood of a piece of abortion legislation to even make it to the voting stage must be 
established. To do this we will run data on pieces of abortion legislation through three stages. 
 
 Stage 1. Whether the relevant legislation is proposed  
o Do senators even attempt to bring up controversial legislation? 
o For some Senators (for example, those in the minority party), bringing up 
controversial legislation may be too big of a risk: their re-election strategy may be 
to make no trouble. For states where this is the case, obviously there will be no 
roll-call votes for controversial legislation. This stage will filter these states out. 
 Stage 2. Whether the proposed legislation is scheduled for a roll-call vote  
o Under what circumstances is a vote scheduled? 
o In many states, especially those when the opposing party is in power or when 
power is fairly evenly split between parties, legislation may be proposed in 
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Congress but then shunted off to a committee where it dies and is never brought 
to the floor for a roll-call vote.  
 Stage 3. When in the election cycle the roll-call vote takes place 
o Do re-election concerns affect when roll-call votes on controversial legislation 
take place? 
o The primary question: when the conditions allow for bringing controversial 
legislation to a roll-call vote, when do the parties schedule the vote?  
 
Dependent Variable/Units of Analysis 
The data on abortion legislation was gathered by hand, using primarily state senate 
website records, where every piece of legislation proposed and any votes or extraneous 
information about the legislation is archived by session. Occasionally, a state website would only 
have part of the information I needed (eg, just the legislation summary and not the full text, or no 
voting records). When this problem arose I supplemented the gap through the use of the website 
Legiscan. These two sources in tandem allowed me compile all the information I needed. 
The following criteria were used in the selection of abortion legislation. Specific limits 
were imposed in order to prevent any confusion or blurred lines about the possible intention 
behind the legislation. 
 A bill is included in the analysis when it expands or restricts abortion access: eg, limits 
who can receive an abortion, when they can receive an abortion, or produces a more convoluted 
process for receiving abortions (longer wait times, etc.). This includes codifications and 
amendments to other bills/laws that may or may not have had anything to do with abortion 
before the amendment was added. 
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There are also certain common types of legislation that I am NOT including despite their 
potential connections with abortion, for specific reasons. These are: 
 Chemical abortion regulations. This is still a fairly new area of medicine, and as 
such it’s natural that new regulations are still being introduced. It’s impossible to 
tell which ones are intended to restrict access and which ones are simply 
providing a framework in which providers can work with this new technology. 
 Telehealth regulations, for the same reasoning as above 
 Anti-coercion laws: this is not restricting access, but providing safety from 
potential abuse. 
 Conscience laws (eg. providing medical personnel with the right to refuse to 
perform abortions). This does not in any significant way prevent abortion-seekers 
from having access to these services. 
 Birth control laws 
 Amendments/laws classifying certain actions (that are already illegal), or spelling 
out the punishment (eg., classifying partial-birth abortion as a felony) 
 Amendments whose purpose are to clarify that certain services do not include 
abortions 
An important note: In the process of gathering this data, eight states were eliminated from 
the analysis for one of the following three reasons. 
1. There simply is no data to be found (there are no relevant pieces of legislation): 
Alaska, Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Wyoming 
2. The election cycle is not contained in the period of interest (2010 – 2016): New 
Jersey. The senate has a 24-48-48-month pattern that falls on odd years, 
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specifically 2011-2013-2017. Because I was only analyzing the 48-month patterns 
with these types of cycles, New Jersey simply didn’t have a 48-month block that I 
could use. 
3. Nebraska is unicameral.  
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables of interest were gathered and analyzed as follows. 
 
1. Strength of political parties 
a. Average vote share per seat – Intended to measure the average safety of 
individual seats. Election data was gathered for each state in a single election. The 
percent of the vote gathered for the Democratic Party and the Republican Party 
were calculated for each seat up for re-election, and then averaged. 2012 was used 
when possible, but for the handful of states that didn’t have elections that year, 
2011 or 2014 were used instead.  
i. Continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
b. Average %seat gain or loss per election cycle – Intended to measure a party’s 
growing or declining strength over the period of interest. Because legislation data 
was gathered over the years 2010-2016, I looked at election data for the years 
2009-2016. Over that period of years, I calculated the average number of seats 
gained or loss per the number of elections had by each state.  
i. Continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
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c. Recent control change – Intended to measure how “solid” a party’s control of the 
senate is. For each state, I selected the election year that begins the period in 
which I gathered data for that state (2010, 2011, or 2012, with most being 2012) 
and looked to see if party control changed in that election. I measured “change” 
by calculating whether one party controlled at least 60% of the seats in the senate 
and if that control was gained or lost in that election. (E.g., if neither party had a 
60% majority before the election and one gained it during the election it is coded 
as a control change.) 
i. Dummy variable: 0 for no change, 1 for change 
d. Party control – Intended to measure a party’s control when a piece of legislation is 
introduced. A “party controlled” senate will have 60% or greater of its seats 
controlled by that party.  
i. -1 = Democrat controlled, 1 = Republican controlled, 0 = neither 
2. Election cycle lengths/type 
a. Taken from common knowledge: election cycles are categorized by their length 
as measured by months (48, 24-48-48, 24) and the cycle type is either staggered 
or non-staggered. For simplicity, the 24-48-48-month cycles are treated as 48-
month cycles, with data only gathered from one of the 48-month-cycle periods.  
i. Non-staggered 48-month cycles are coded as 1, staggered 48-month cycles 
are coded as 2, and 24-month cycles are coded as 3. 
3. Senate professionalism 
a. Measure taken from the National Conference of State Legislatures: each state is 
sorted into five categories of professionalism, based on three measures: the time 
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legislators spend on the job, the amount they are compensated, and the size of the 
legislator’s staff. The original analysis was completed in 2008, and I’m making 
the assumption that if analyzed again (for the year 2012, for example) the 
professionalism levels of the senates would not have changed significantly. 
i. I took the color-coded categories and assigned integers ranging from -2 
(unprofessional) to +2 (very professional).  
 
The dependent variables vary by Phase. 
 Phase 1 
o Binary variable: proposal present/not present (1,0) 
o Logistic regression 
 Phase 2 
o Binary variable 
 DV: roll-call vote present/not present (1, 0)  
 IV: cycle_type, timing_proposal, professionalism, party_security 
 Party security: control_change, avg_vote_share, 
avg_seat_loss_per_election 
o Logistic regression 
 Phase 3 
o Continuous variable from 0 to 1, the timing of roll-call votes given on individual 
controversial pieces of legislation 
 DV: roll-call vote present/not present (1, 0)  
 IV: cycle_type, timing_proposal, professionalism, party_security 
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 Party security: control_change, avg_vote_share, 
avt_seat_loss_per_election 
o I first look up the beginning and ending election cycle dates for each state in the 
relevant time period (eg, 11/4/10 – 11/6/14). Each month within that time period 
(count them: 48) is assigned a number. November 2010 is #1, December 2010 is 
#2, January 2011 is #3, etc. I then look up the date for the first relevant roll-call 
vote given on each piece of relevant legislation in that state in the relevant time 
period. For example, 4/15/2011. April of 2011 is month #6 (six months since the 
last election). 6/48 = 0.125. The closer to 1 this number is, the closer to the 
following election that vote takes place.  
o The first non-procedural roll-call vote is used 
o Linear regression 
o Previous state legislatures never hold a session after an election date, so there is 
no risk of “spillover.”  
 
Analysis  
 
Stage 1 
The intent of Stage 1 of the analysis is to draw broad conclusions as to why certain states 
proposed abortion legislation while others did not.  
The six states that did not propose abortion legislation in the time frame of interest (2010 – 
2016) were Alaska, Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wyoming. I did no 
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statistical analysis other than simple summary statistics because there were so few states that had 
no data points.  
One thing that all six had in common was there was no recent party control change, 
compared to about 30% of the other states with data that did have recent control change. They 
were also spread out geographically and were varied in their party control: North Carolina and 
Wyoming had Republican-controlled Senates, Connecticut had Democrat-controlled Senates, 
Montana and Nevada had neither party in control, and Alaska changed in 2012 from neither 
having control to Republicans having control. Their election cycle type, percent of Republican 
seats gained or lost per election, average Republican vote share per seat, and level of 
professionalism were similarly varied. From this information, we can hypothesize that perhaps 
the Republican and Democrat party-controlled senates felt stable as there had been no recent 
power change, and thus weren’t willing to bring up controversial subjects and risk upsetting the 
status-quo. This doesn’t explain why Montana and Nevada didn’t bring up controversial subjects, 
unless they were perhaps afraid of losing what ground they had gained.  
When including states that had only one relevant data point (California, Delaware, Illinois, 
Maine, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont, and Washington), six of the fourteen (43%) were 
Democrat-controlled, four (29%) were controlled by neither, and only three were controlled by 
Republicans (21%). Alaska, again, switched from being controlled by neither to being controlled 
by Republicans. Additionally, at least five of these “one-point states” had an average declining 
number of Republican seats in their state, and three of them had a recent control change. This 
disturbs our previous hypothesis that states without recent control changes are less likely to bring 
up controversial legislation, but it does suggest that states with a declining Republican party are 
less likely to bring up abortion legislation. This, perhaps, means that Republican parties stay 
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away from controversial legislation when they are weaker and striving for a majority. Or, it 
could simply mean that without control of the senate, they know it’s not likely that their 
proposed legislation will come to a roll-call vote, and so don’t bother. 
In short, there is no clear reasoning for why these handful of states had no relevant data.  
 
Stage 2 
The intent of Stage 2 is to determine under what conditions abortion legislation that has 
been proposed is scheduled for a roll-call vote.  
 I first tested all independent variables separately. I also took note of the different sorts of 
abortion legislation under consideration. There are two main varieties – the expansion and the 
restriction of abortion access. I created a restriction dataset from the legislation that contained 
only legislation for the restriction of abortion access. Because the majority of data I gathered had 
to do with restrictive abortion legislation, a dataset containing only expansion legislation would 
have been much smaller than either of the others (36 datapoints), and so I didn’t test with it. 
Similarly, the opposite of other datasets (i.e., an “unprofessional” dataset) didn’t have a good fit 
and so weren’t included. Recall that Hypotheses 2 and 3 are that more professional senates and 
senates with longer, non-staggered election cycles will have more distinct patterns. From the 
complete dataset and the restriction dataset then I created six datasets in total. 
 
Table 1: Datasets 
Dataset Title Data Contained in Dataset Data points 
Complete All data 229 
Restricted Abortion restriction data only 193 
Professional Most professional senates (0 – 2) only 172 
Professional+Restriction Most professional senates (0 – 2) only, 
abortion restriction data only 
150 
Cycle 48-month non-staggered election cycles only 94 
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Cycle+Restriction 48-month non-staggered election cycles only, 
abortion restriction data only 
84 
 
I ran every model in Stages 2 and 3 with each dataset to watch for unexpected 
differences. However, because of the partisan split between the restriction of abortion access and 
the expansion of abortion access I only discuss the results of the restricted dataset when running 
models with independent variables that are party-specific, unless an unexpected difference 
appears between datasets. Additionally, I only show the R output when there appeared to be a 
relationship. For a single model, if there are relevant differences in the results of different 
datasets, I show and discuss the results of each.  
All modeling was done using R.  
The following binomial models for Stage 2 were created as follows.  
 
Table 2: Binomial Regression Models 
Model X Value 
(Categorical) 
Y Value Dataset Emphasis Results Summary 
Model 
1 
Cycle type (months) 
1: 48 
2: 48 (staggered) 
3: 24 
Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
Complete 
Professional 
Cycle 
n/a 
Model 
2 
Professionalism 
-2: Unprofessional 
2: Professional 
Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
Complete 
Professional 
Cycle 
More 
professionalism, 
less likely to be a 
vote 
Model 
3 
Recent Control 
Change 
0: No recent change 
1: Recent change 
Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
All six n/a 
Model 
4 
Party Control 
-1: Democratic control 
0: Neither control 
1: Republican control 
Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
Restriction 
Professional+Restriction 
Cycle+Restriction 
Strong Republican 
party, more likely 
to be a vote 
Model X Value 
(Continuous) 
Y Value Dataset Emphasis Results Summary 
Model 
5 
%Seat Loss/Gain 
Ranging from -1 to 1 
Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
Restriction 
Professional+Restriction 
Cycle+Restriction 
More Republican 
seats gained, more 
likely to be a vote 
21 
 
Model 
6 
Timing Proposal 
Ranging from 0 to 1 
Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
Complete Later proposed, less 
likely to be a vote 
Model 
7 
Avg. Vote Share Presence 
of RC 
Vote 
Restriction 
Professional+Restriction 
Cycle+Restriction 
Greater vote share, 
more likely to be a 
vote 
 
 The residual deviances on all models were large, but of these first seven, models 2, 4, 5, 
6, and 7 showed a small amount of fit. The results gained from the two basic datasets (complete 
and restriction) did not differ from the other, smaller datasets used to test the models, so only the 
complete and restricted dataset results will be shown. 
 I analyzed Model 2 with the complete dataset because professionalism is not party-
specific. The complete dataset had a slightly better fit than the restriction dataset anyway, which 
is understandable because it and has a wider variety of variables that the restricted dataset. The 
results of running Model 2, seen in Table 3, suggest that the more professional a senate is, the 
less likely it is for abortion legislation to come to a roll call vote. This could be because a more 
professional senate has greater re-election concerns, and thus the senators and their parties are 
more cautious and less willing to broach controversial subjects. 
 
Table 3: Professionalism (complete) 
Professionalism Coefficient 
(standard error) 
-2 1.099 
(1.155) 
-1 -2.223. 
(1.198) 
0 -2.485* 
(1.176) 
1 -2.197. 
(1.291) 
2 -3.008* 
(1.273) 
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 Model 4, contrary to Model 2, has the party-specific variable of party control (more than 
60% of seats controlled by a single party). It’s reasonable to assume that different types of 
abortion legislation would be treated differently depending on whether its “favorable” party 
controls the senate or not; restrictive abortion legislation will theoretically be treated differently 
under a Democrat-controlled senate than under a Republican-controlled senate. The results of 
running Model 4, seen in Table 4, suggest that roll call votes of restrictive abortion legislation 
are more likely to occur under a strong Republican party. This is unsurprising, since it’s easy for 
legislation to die in committee when their favored party is not in control of the senate.  
 
Table 4: Party Control (restriction) 
Party Control Coefficient 
(standard error) 
-1 -2.9444** 
(1.0259) 
0 0.7632 
(1.1007) 
1 2.3507* 
(1.0462) 
 
Model 5, similar to Model 4, had a variable that was party-specific. Percentage of seat 
loss/gain refers to the Republican Party only. A negative value indicates Republican seat losses, 
a positive value indicates Republican seat gains. Again, I ran both the complete and restricted 
datasets. The restricted set had a larger standard error, but is likely more accurate (Table 4). 
However, even with the complete dataset (Table 4), the results were similar: the more seats the 
Republican Party gained on average, the more likely a vote would be scheduled. This is 
consistent with the results of Model 4, suggesting that a strong Republican Party makes it easier 
for restrictive abortion legislation to be scheduled for a vote. It is interesting to note that the 
complete dataset arguably gave the stronger result. Because both results are weak it could simply 
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be coincidental. However, it could also imply that political parties don’t necessarily employ 
different methods for different types of legislation in regards to scheduling roll-call votes. The 
complete dataset results imply that when Republicans gain more seats, they are more likely to 
schedule roll-call votes regardless of whether they are for pro-life legislation or for pro-choice 
legislation, which goes against what I would expect, as I’ve assumed that a Republican-
controlled senate would leave pro-choice legislation in committees to die. 
 
Table 4: Seat Loss/Gain 
Dataset Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Restriction Only 7.2128* 
(2.8250) 
Complete 7.1238** 
(24736) 
 
Model 6 had variables that were not party-specific, so I used the results from the 
complete dataset. The “proposal timing” variable is of particular interest, because it has to do 
with when certain actions take place in the election cycle. The results show that the later a piece 
of legislation is proposed, the less likely it is for that same piece of legislation to be scheduled 
for a roll-call vote (Table 5). This could suggest a general trend towards caution: it may be that 
senators would generally prefer to schedule controversial votes earlier in the election cycle, 
regardless of the current strength or weakness of their party. 
 
Table 5: Timing Proposal (complete) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Timing Proposal -1.4145* 
(0.6759) 
 
Both datasets gave similar results for Model 7, but because it used a party-specific 
variable I’ve shown the results of the restriction dataset (Table 6). They suggest that the higher 
24 
 
percentage of the vote share that the Republican Party receives, the more likely it is for a roll-call 
vote to be scheduled. This makes sense because a strong party makes it easier for proposed 
legislation to be scheduled, rather than shunted off to die somewhere in committee.  
 
Table 6: (restriction) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Avg. Vote Share 4.296* 
(1.815) 
 
Stage 3 
The intent of Stage 3 is to determine what factors influence when a roll-call vote is 
scheduled. This can be considered the highlight of this study. As in Stage 2, I used all six 
datasets when attempting to find patterns. After examining each variable independently, I created 
multiple linear regressions and found some more distinct patterns within those.  
The models for Stage 3 were as follows.  
Model X-Value (Categorical) Y-Value  Dataset Emphasis Results Summary 
Model 8 Cycle Type (months) 
1: 48 
2: 48 (staggered) 
3: 24 
Timing 
of Vote 
Complete 
Professional 
Cycle 
48 and 24, later 
votes 
Model 9 Professionalism 
-2: Unprofessional 
2: Professional 
Timing 
of Vote 
Complete 
Cycle 
n/a 
Model 
10 
Recent Control Change 
0: No recent change 
1: Recent change 
Timing 
of Vote 
All six 
 
Recent change, 
earlier votes. 
Model 
11 
Party Control 
-1: Democratic control 
0: Neither control 
1: Republican control 
Timing 
of Vote 
Restriction 
Cycle+Restriction 
Professional+Restriction 
Stronger 
Republican party, 
earlier votes. 
Stronger 
Democratic party, 
later votes.  
Model X Value (Continuous) Y-Value Dataset Emphasis Results Summary 
Model 
12 
%Seat Loss/Gain 
Ranging from -1 to 1 
Timing 
of Vote 
Restriction 
Cycle+Restriction 
Professional+Restriction 
More Republican 
gains, earlier votes 
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Model 
13 
Timing Proposal 
Ranging from 0 to 1 
Timing 
of Vote 
Complete Later proposal, 
later votes 
Model 
14 
Avg Vote Share Timing 
of Vote 
Restriction 
Cycle+Restriction 
Professional+Restriction 
Greater vote share, 
earlier votes 
Table 7: Linear Regression Models 
  
As with the binomial regressions, almost all of the linear regressions had poor R2 values 
on their own. The exception was Model 13, but the reason is obvious: when a roll-call vote is 
scheduled is understandably closely related to when it was first proposed (Table 8).  
Table 8: Timing Proposal (complete) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Timing Proposal 0.78909*** 
(0.08407) 
  
 
Figure 1 - Scatterplot, Timing Vote vs Timing Proposal 
However, unlike in Stage 2, this time the use of the professional, professional+restriction, 
cycle, and cycle+restriction datasets caused a large improvement in most of the R2 values: at 
least by 0.1 for all shown, and sometimes by nearly 0.3. The significance measures of most of 
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the models were improved as well by use of the other datasets. Models 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 (already 
shown in Table 8), and 14 all appeared to have some correlation between the variables.  
 Model 8 was the only model that did best with the simple complete dataset. Cycle types 
are not a party-specific variable, and so the complete dataset results are presented in Table 9. 
They suggest that cycle types consisting of 48 non-staggered months and 24 months had roll-call 
votes scheduled later in the cycle. This is an interesting potential relationship, since I can’t see 
any immediate reason for why this would be. The R2 is extremely small however, so it’s possibly 
just coincidental.  
Table 9: Timing Proposal (complete) 
Cycle Type Coefficient 
(standard error) 
48 months 
(nonstaggered) 
0.33750*** 
(0.04794) 
48 months 
(staggered) 
0.06650 
(0.06555) 
24 months 0.28750** 
(0.09979) 
 
 
Figure 2 - Scatterplot, Model 8, Timing Vote vs Cycle Type (complete dataset) 
The Model 10 results were most evident with the professional and 
professional+restriction datasets. Both had nearly exactly the same results, so I chose to show the 
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one taken from professional as its data had the greatest variety (Table 9). The results indicate that 
roll-call votes take place earlier in an election cycle when there has been a recent control change, 
and take place later when there has been no control change. This potentially runs contrary to my 
Hypothesis 1, which stated that stronger parties will schedule roll-call votes earlier in an election 
cycle, and weaker parties will schedule roll-call votes later in an election cycle. In theory, a 
recent control change indicates some amount of instability in the senate, which in turn indicates 
weaker parties. It could be the case however that a recent control change indicates a party that 
has been growing in strength and is feeling confident in its ability to continue to grow, which 
would give senators more confidence to schedule votes later in the election cycle. Or, it could 
also indicate a party that has been growing in strength precisely because it schedules its roll-call 
votes late in the election cycle. This last theory is unlikely, however, as it becomes much more 
difficult to schedule roll-call votes when a party is not in control of a senate.  
Table 9: Control Change (professional) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Control Change -0.20106** 
(0.06962) 
  
28 
 
 
Figure 3 - Scatterplot, Model 10, Timing Vote vs Control Change (professional dataset) 
For dataset comparison, the following table shows the results using the complete dataset. 
 
Table 10: Control Change (complete data) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Control Change -0.16535* 
(0.06311) 
 
Because the independent variable of party control is partisan-specific, datasets that are 
built from the restricted dataset is preferred. The dataset cycle+restriction also happened to have 
the best fit, so those results are shown (Table 11). The results suggest that with a stronger 
Republican Party, abortion-restriction roll-call votes are scheduled earlier. This implies that a 
strong party is more motivated to “hide” its controversial roll-call votes from its constituents. 
Interestingly, with a strong Democratic Party there appears to be a tendency towards later 
abortion-restriction roll-call votes. However, because this is a much smaller dataset, this 
appearance comes from a single data point (Figure 5) which is an issue. 
 
Table 11: Party Control (cycle+restriction) 
Party Control Coefficient 
(standard error) 
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-1 0.8542*** 
(0.1867) 
0 -0.5313* 
(0.2286) 
1 -0.5625** 
(0.1924) 
  
 
Figure 5 - Scatterplot, Model 11, Timing Vote vs Party Control (cycle+restricted dataset) 
Model 12 uses the party-specific variable of Republican percentage of seats lost/gained per 
election over the years 2009 – 2016, so my preference is to use datasets derived from the 
restriction datasets. Of those, the cycle+restriction dataset had the best fit (Table 12). However, 
the dataset with the best fit overall was the cycle dataset (Table 13), and so both are shown. They 
both imply that with a greater percentage of Republican seats gained per election, the earlier roll-
call votes are likely to take place. This is similar to the results of Model 11, suggesting that a 
stronger Republican party prefers to have its controversial votes scheduled earlier in the election 
cycle where they are less likely to upset constituents. Upon review, it makes sense that the cycle 
dataset would have stronger results, since it makes sense that a strong party (possibly regardless 
of affiliation) would want all controversial votes, be they on Republican-sponsored bills or on 
Democrat-sponsored bills, to be earlier in the election cycle.  
 
Table 12: Seat Loss/Gain (cycle+restriction) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Seat Loss/Gain -1.20853. 
(0.61889) 
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Table 13: Seat Loss/Gain (cycle) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Seat Loss/Gain -1.31721* 
(0.57313) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Scatterplot, Model 12 Timing Vote vs Seat Loss/Gain (cycle dataset) 
The results for Model 12 using the complete dataset shown below, for comparison. 
Contrary to the cycle and cycle+restriction datasets, the professionalism and 
professionalism+restriction datasets did not have an improved fit. 
Table 14: Seat Loss/Gain (complete) 
Party Control Coefficient 
(standard error) 
-1 0.7605*** 
(0.1550) 
0 -0.3277. 
(0.1713) 
1 -0.3822* 
(0.1590) 
 
Model 14 also had a party-specific variable: the average vote share per seat the 
Republican Party received in a single election. The best fit was found using the cycle+restriction 
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model (Table 15). The results suggest that a greater average vote share for the Republican Party 
leads to restriction legislation roll-call votes being scheduled earlier in the election cycle.  
Table 15: Avg. Vote Share (cycle+restriction) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Avg. Vote Share -1.6703** 
(0.5279) 
 
 
Figure 7 - Scatterplot, Model 14, Timing Vote vs Avg Vote Share (cycle+restriction dataset) 
The professional and professional+restriction datasets, though a worse fit than 
cycle+restriction, were still a better fit than the complete and restriction datasets.  
After running each independent variable by itself, I ran the categorical and continuous 
independent variables as multiple linear regressions. Because there are a mix of party-specific 
and non-party specific variables, I used the restriction only datasets. I got the best fit of the 
categorical variables when I eliminated cycle_type as a variable and found that cycle+restriction 
had the best fit (Table 16), though professional+restriction was a better fit than the simple 
restriction dataset. The relationships and correlations described in the previous analyses 
remained. 
Table 16: Multiple (cycle+restriction) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
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Control Change: 
1 
0.07292 
(0.12268) 
Party Control: 0 -0.74479** 
(0.23758) 
Party Control: 1 -0.72396** 
(0.22117) 
Professionalism: 
0 
-0.21354. 
(0.10625) 
 
For the continuous variables, I found the most useful results came from the cycle dataset, 
as they were somewhat significant along with having a reasonable R2 value of 0.4819 (Table 17).  
 
Table 17: Multiple (cycle) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Seat Loss/Gain -1.0287. 
(0.4929) 
Avg. Vote Share -1.4663* 
(0.5068) 
 
However, because they are party-specific I am showing the cycle+restriction results as 
well, though the only result of some significance here is of the average vote share (Table 18). 
The professional+restriction dataset had less significance and a smaller R2 value of 0.4652, but it 
was still a better fit than the restriction dataset.  
Table 18: Multiple (cycle+restriction) 
Variable Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Seat Loss/Gain -0.8876 
(0.5279) 
Avg. Vote Share -1.4898* 
(0.5130) 
 
Conclusions 
The results from all of the variables of interest are not fine-tuned. Especially with the 
results taken from small datasets, more in-depth study is needed to make any sort of solid 
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conclusions. For Stage 2 in particular I was unsatisfied with the poor fit of the variables, which 
prevents me from drawing satisfactory conclusions from them. However, what I hoped to 
accomplish was to establish a baseline from which further study could operate, and there do 
appear to be three clear trends in Stage 3: 
1. Three measures of party strength that I had (party control [over 60% of seats], 
average percent Republican seats gained per election, and average Republican vote 
share in a single election: Models 11, 12, and 14, respectively) all indicated that with 
a strong Republican party, controversial abortion roll-call votes were scheduled 
earlier in the election cycle, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
2. The cycle and cycle+restriction datasets were frequently the best fit for the models. 
Because the “cycle” in question was the 48-month non-staggered cycle, this is in 
agreement with Hypothesis 2 which states that longer, non-staggered cycles will have 
more evident patterns than other cycles. 
3. The professional and professional+restriction was not usually the best fit for the 
models, it was almost always a better fit than the complete dataset. This is in 
agreement with Hypothesis 3, which states that more professional senates will have 
more evident patterns than less professional senates.  
One model does potentially give evidence against Hypothesis 1, and that is Model 10. 
However, when analyzing it, I realized that while a control shift does suggest a less stable 
position in the senate for both parties, there is a lot of information that it does not include, such 
as which party is in control, whether it was a slight change (i.e., gaining one more seat) or a large 
change (i.e., gaining five more seats). More information surrounding this one variable would 
need to be gathered in order to do a thorough analysis. 
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 Going forward, there are several possible ways to improve and clarify the trends shown 
in this study. First and foremost, increasing the amount of data. Though the original dataset was 
reasonably large with 229 data points, because of all the variety within those data points, when 
more datasets were created they became quite small, so even the appearance of a reasonable 
model fit is in question. Perhaps broadening the definition of abortion legislation, or adding other 
sorts of controversial legislation with clear party splits (i.e., gun control legislation or LGBTQ+ 
legislation) could help broaden the data pool. 
 Secondly, narrowing the focus of the study could be beneficial. Fifty senates allows for a 
wide variety between senates. This is not a bad thing, but there are potential benefits to, for 
example, studying senates as geographic groups, or potentially studying separately how the 
Republican and Democrat parties treat various types of legislation. Doing case studies of key 
state senates could also be beneficial. 
 Thirdly, using more precise modeling. I did simple binomial logistic regressions and 
linear regressions, but taking the time to find the best model possible for each variable could be 
much more illuminating. 
 Fourthly, there are a large number of potential confounding variables that I did not cover. 
These include the makeup and partisanship of the constituents, the varying scheduling rules and 
practices of individual senates, the partisanship of the Governorship and the House, varying 
incumbency re-election laws, and the possible effect of incumbency on voting behaviors and re-
election confidence.  
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